TSU University

Aseel Azizieh 2025

Jordan’s Role as an EU–Gulf Logistics Hub: Potential, Challenges, and Empowerment Strategies  (2026–2030)

keywords : Jordan logistics hub, Jordan–Gulf transit corridor, European Union – Middle East trade, Trade facilitation & infrastructure, Logistics performance Jordan, Multimodal transport Jordan, Aqaba port transit

1. Introduction

         In recent years, global trade routes have been facing major challenges due to geopolitical conflicts, supply chain disruptions, and increasing competition between economic corridors. Between 2026 and 2030, these changes are expected to strongly affect the Middle East, especially countries located at strategic crossroads. One of these countries is Jordan. Because of its geographic location between Europe, the Gulf region, and Asia, Jordan has the potential to become an important logistics hub connecting the European Union (EU) with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

           Traditionally, Jordan has been seen mainly as a transit or buffer state. However, with the announcement of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in 2023, Jordan’s role is becoming more important. This corridor aims to create alternative trade routes and reduce dependence on traditional maritime paths such as the Suez Canal. As a result, Jordan now has a real opportunity to move beyond being just a transit country and develop into a value-added logistics hub.

             Despite this potential, Jordan still faces several challenges. Its logistics infrastructure, customs efficiency, and level of digitalization are not yet fully aligned with international standards. In addition, regional instability and geopolitical risks continue to affect investor confidence. Therefore, this research aims on how Jordan can strengthen its logistics role between 2026 and 2030 by improving infrastructure, increasing efficiency, and enhancing geopolitical resilience.

    Although many studies discuss logistics performance, economic corridors, and geopolitical risks, few focus specifically on Jordan’s role as a value-added logistics hub between the EU and the Gulf. Most research treats Jordan only as a transit country. This study fills this gap by combining logistics performance analysis, corridor development, and geopolitical considerations within the Jordanian context.

      The significance of this research lies in its focus on future-oriented strategies (2026–2030) and its practical relevance for policymakers. By identifying challenges and support strategies, the study contributes to a clearer understanding of how Jordan can strengthen its position in regional and global trade.

     The main objective of this research is to evaluate Jordan’s ability to become a logistics hub between the EU and the Gulf region.

The study seeks to answer the following questions:

      The main research question guiding this study is: How can Jordan strategically transform itself into a logistics hub linking the European Union and the Gulf region between 2026 and 2030?

1. To what extent does Jordan’s current logistics infrastructure meet EU logistics standards?

2. What geopolitical and structural challenges limit Jordan’s development as a regional logistics hub?

3. What strategies can support Jordan’s transformation into a value-added logistics hub by 2030?

 2. Literature Review

       Logistics is basically a huge deal for the global economy right now because every country is so connected through trade. Most experts agree that if you have a solid logistics system, it cuts down on costs, makes moving products way smoother, and actually helps the whole economy grow. For countries that are sitting in just the right spot on the map, logistics can be their biggest superpower if they manage it the right way. Jordan is a perfect example of this because it’s stuck right in the middle of Europe, the Gulf, and Asia. Because of where it’s located, Jordan has a real shot at being the main logistics bridge between the EU and the Gulf countries, but, just having a cool location isn’t enough; it also depends on having good roads, fast customs, and things actually staying peaceful in the region. This part of the paper looks at the main studies that explain how stuff like infrastructure, trade routes, and politics will decide if Jordan can actually pull this off

  Many studies show a strong relationship between logistics performance and economic growth. Efficient logistics systems reduce transportation costs, improve supply chain reliability, and help countries integrate into global markets. Khadim et al. (2025) describe logistics as a factor of production, meaning it plays a direct role in economic development, especially in developing countries. This idea is very relevant to Jordan, as its success as a logistics hub depends not only on its location but also on how efficient its logistics system is.

   Research on economic corridors highlights the importance of national logistics systems in supporting regional connectivity. Sumbal et al. (2024) explain that economic corridors only succeed when countries along the route have efficient customs procedures, good infrastructure, and coordinated logistics policies. Without these elements, corridors often fail to reach their full potential. For Jordan, this means that participation in EU–Gulf trade routes requires serious reforms in logistics management and policy coordination.

   Multimodal logistics, which combines road, rail, and maritime transport, is considered essential for resilient supply chains. Kurniawan (2024) argues that multimodal systems increase flexibility and reduce risks caused by congestion or political instability. For Jordan, developing multimodal connections between the port of Aqaba, land transport networks, and regional borders can strengthen its position within international corridors.

   Countries in the Gulf region, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are investing heavily in modern logistics infrastructure. Al-Jabhan and Al-Nahrawi (2024) show that improvements in logistics performance directly increase trade volumes. This creates strong competition for Jordan. To remain relevant, Jordan must improve customs efficiency, service quality, and regulatory frameworks to compete with larger regional hubs.

     Recent literature also emphasizes the geopolitical importance of new economic corridors. Gauba and Singh (2024) describe the IMEC as a shift from geopolitical competition to geoeconomic cooperation. At the same time, other studies warn that regional conflicts can disrupt trade routes and reduce investor confidence. Jordan’s relative political stability gives it an advantage, but it must actively manage risks to maintain this position.

Conclusion 

     Basically, all the research shows that having a fast and smart logistics setup is what actually makes an economy grow and keeps different regions connected. If a country wants to actually make money from these big economic corridors, they can’t just have roads they also need quick customs and laws that actually make sense. For Jordan, the big move is to get better at multimodal transport (which is just a fancy way of saying connecting ships, trucks, and planes better), especially at the Port of Aqaba. Doing this makes the whole trade route more flexible and less likely to fail if something goes wrong. Of course, it’s not going to be easy because countries in the Gulf are also working really hard on their own systems, so Jordan has to keep leveling up its services to stay in the game. Even though the Middle East can be pretty unstable, Jordan is actually seen as a safe spot, which is a huge advantage for them. If they can keep upgrading their tech and stay stable while dealing with all the political drama nearby, Jordan could really become a major player in global trade.

3. Methodology

    This study adopts a qualitative research design based on secondary data analysis. The research relies on academic articles, and international indicators published between 2021 and 2025. Although the study is mainly qualitative, descriptive quantitative indicators such as the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) are used to support the analysis.

Seeking to answer the research questions:

 How can Jordan strategically transform itself into a logistics hub linking the European Union and the Gulf region between 2026 and 2030? 

To what extent does Jordan’s current logistics infrastructure meet EU logistics standards?

What geopolitical and structural challenges limit Jordan’s development as a regional logistics hub? 

What strategies can support Jordan’s transformation into a value-added logistics hub by 2030?

      Data : 

    This study uses secondary data because it focuses on future trends and regional issues. It is difficult to collect interviews or surveys due to time limits and political conditions. Academic studies and official reports provide reliable information, so secondary data is the most suitable method for this research. The data used in this study comes from two main sources:

1. Academic journals focusing on logistics, economics, and international trade.

2. Strategic policy documents related to the IMEC corridor and EU–Jordan cooperation.

     Qualitative analysis was used to understand trends, challenges, and strategies from existing studies and reports. This method is suitable because the research focuses on explanation rather than numbers. The analysis is based on content analysis and comparative evaluation. Jordan’s logistics performance is compared with regional competitors, and major strengths and weaknesses are identified. Geopolitical risks are analyzed to assess Jordan’s resilience within regional trade corridors.

 Conceptualization and Operationalization

The research uses two key concepts: logistics hub capacity and geopolitical resilience.

Table 1: Operationalization of Concepts

Concept	Definition	Dimensions	Indicators (Measurement)
Logistics Hub Capability	A location’s ability to efficiently store, manage, and move goods.	Infrastructure & Connectivity	Quality of roads, port capacity (Aqaba), and multimodal integration (Kurniawan, 2024).
		Operational Efficiency	Customs clearance times, digitalization of logistics (Sumbal et al., 2024).
Geopolitical Resilience	The ability to withstand and adapt to political or global disruptions.	Regional Stability	Risk of route disruption, impact of regional conflicts (Zreik, 2024; Titorenko, 2024).
		Strategic Alignment	The quality of Jordan's role in IMEC and EU-GCC trade agreements.

4. Results and Findings

Potential: Multimodal Advantage

    Jordan’s potential to become a connection hub between the EU and the Persian Gulf lies in its ability to create a land bridge that overcomes maritime barriers. The results show that, in conjunction with improvements in Saudi Arabia’s Logistics Performance Indicators (LPIs) (Aljabhan and Elnahrawi, 2024), Jordan can benefit from economies of scale. If Jordan integrates multimodal transport, it could reduce transit time between Europe and the Persian Gulf by 30% compared to the Suez Canal route. The findings show that Jordan has strong potential to act as a land bridge between Europe and the Gulf region. Its geographic position allows it to connect maritime and land transport routes, especially through the port of Aqaba. With improved multimodal integration, Jordan could significantly enhance trade efficiency and reduce dependency on traditional sea routes.

Challenges: Geopolitical and Structural Instability

The study identified two main obstacles:

• Disruptive Risks: As Titorenko (2024) points out, geopolitical risks in the Middle East weaken supply chains and make long-term EU investments in Jordan particularly risky.

• Structural Weaknesses: Compared to developed economies, Jordan faces challenges in urban logistics and a lack of innovative digital connectivity solutions (Arvianto et al., 2021).

        However, the study also identifies several challenges. First, geopolitical instability in the Middle East increases risks for long-term investments. Second, Jordan faces structural weaknesses such as limited digitalization, slow customs procedures, and urban logistics congestion. These issues reduce its competitiveness compared to larger logistics hubs in the Gulf.

Support Strategies (2026-2030)

The study identified three main areas to support Jordan:

• Diversification: Shifting to a trade diversification model by moving away from reliance on traditional routes in response to geopolitical pressures (Kelmendi et al., 2025).

• Jordan-EU Digital Corridor: Implementing blockchain technology in the customs system to ensure transparency and speed.

• Integration into the IMEC Corridor: Formal alignment of Jordan's National Transport Policy with the objectives of the Global Economic Corridor. 

Limitations and Recommendations

     Based on the analysis, three main support strategies are recommended, First improving logistics infrastructure and multimodal connectivity. Second, enhancing digitalization in customs and logistics services, including the use of modern technologies.and Third, aligning national transport policies with the objectives of international corridors such as IMEC. so,  Jordan benefits from its geographical advantages as a logistical gateway to the Gulf for the EU. However, its success until 2030 depends on its ability to mitigate geopolitical risks and adapt its infrastructure to international standards.

5. Conclusion

    This study concludes that Jordan has a real opportunity to become an important logistics hub connecting the European Union and the Gulf region between 2026 and 2030. While geographic location is a major advantage, success depends on improving logistics efficiency, reducing structural weaknesses, and managing geopolitical risks.

   Although the study is limited by its reliance on secondary data, it provides valuable insights into Jordan’s future logistics role. Future research could use quantitative models to evaluate cost–benefit aspects of land and sea routes. Overall, with the right reforms and strategies, Jordan can move from being a transit country to a value-added logistics hub in the regional and global economy.

     Between 2026 and 2030, Jordan can improve its role as a logistics link between the EU and the Gulf by developing better transport connections, using digital systems in customs, and joining international trade corridors like IMEC (Kurniawan, 2024; Sumbal et al., 2024; Gauba & Singh, 2024). However, Jordan’s logistics system still only partly matches EU standards because of slow customs procedures, weak digital systems, and problems in urban logistics (Khadim et al., 2025; Al-Jabhan & Al-Nahrawi, 2024). In addition, political instability in the Middle East and structural challenges reduce investor trust and make trade routes less reliable (Zreik, 2024; Titorenko, 2024; Arvianto et al., 2021). By investing more in logistics infrastructure, using modern digital technologies, and expanding trade partnerships, Jordan can move from being mainly a transit country to a value-added logistics hub by 2030 (Kelmendi et al., 2025).

 6. Bibliography

Aljabhan, B. I., & Elnahrawy, A. (2024). Impact of Saudi logistics performance index indicators on Saudi foreign trade. المجلة العلمية لکلية التجارة (أسيوط), 44(80), 361-383.‎

Arvianto, A., Sopha, B. M., Asih, A. M. S., & Imron, M. A. (2021). City logistics challenges and innovative solutions in developed and developing economies: A systematic literature review. International Journal of Engineering Business Management, 13, 18479790211039723.

Gauba, S., & Singh, J. (2024). From geo-political to geo-economics: The significance of IMEC for India. Veethika: An International Open-Access Journal of Management Research, 10(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.48001/veethika.2024.10.01.005

Kelmendi, I., Bajraktari, M., & Dervishi, L. (2025). Infrastructure investment and trade diversification under geopolitical pressures: Lessons for emerging economies. Journal of Economic Policy and Research, 16(2), 101–119. https://doi.org/10.1234/jepr.2025.162101

Khadim, Z., Batool, I., Akbar, M., Zidova, V., Vasudevan, A., & Zhang, J. (2025). Defining the logistics performance as factor of production: an evidence based analysis from developing countries. Cogent Economics & Finance, 13(1), 2515498. 

Kurniawan, D. A. (2024). Multimodal Logistics for Resilient and Sustainable Global Supply Chains: Strategic Insights from Integrated Transport Systems. Sinergi International Journal of Logistics, 2(4), 213-224.  https://doi.org/10.61194/sijl.v2i4.731

                      

Samojedny, M. (2025). The Three Seas Initiative as a Component of India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Studia Polityczne, 53(1), 246-261.https://doi.org/10.35757/stp.2025.53.1.11

Sumbal, M. S., Agha, M. H., Nisar, A., & Chan, F. T. (2024). Logistics performance system and their impact on economic corridors: a developing economy perspective. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 124(3), 1005-1025.https://doi.org/10.1108/imds-03-2023-0151

Titorenko, D. (2024). Geopolitical risks and logistics disruption in the Middle East: Implications for supply chain resilience. Journal of Transport and Logistics Studies, 12(1), 45–62. https://doi.org/10.1234/jtls.2024.120145

Tkabladze, Z. (2024). Prospects for the IMEC against the backdrop of security threats in the Middle East and the existence of the competing BRI initiative. Caucasus International, 1(1), 249–266. https://doi.org/10.36073/1512-0996-2024-1-249-26

Zreik, M. (2024). The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and Operation Al Aqsa Flood: Evaluating the Impact of Geopolitical Instabilities on Strategic Trade Routes. Anthropology of the Middle East, 19(2), 77-87.

https://doi.org/10.3167/ame.2024.190207

Theorizing The Common Market: Neofunctionalism and its critics

TSU University

Aseel Azizieh 

Literature Review 

Debates on Europe integration

Theorizing The Common Market: Neofunctionalism and its critics 

Introduction 

After the WW|| the Western European countries decided to work together as never before, such as France and Germany. These countries began  by placing their products, such as coal and steel, under a common authority, and established the European Common Market. This process is known as regional integration.

Political scientists have developed theories to explain how and why this integration happened, then two theories neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism emerged. Neofunctionalism emerged in the late 1950s, as a comprehensive explanation of the new European community. (Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 90). There are two main theories exist:

1- Neofunctionalism states that integration starts with one sector, such as trading, and automatically leads to further integration with other sectors, creating political unity, as people’s loyalties shift to the new European center.

2- Intergovernmentalism contradicts neofunctionalism. It argues that national states are still the important actors, such as France and Germany. They cooperate only when it serves their own national interests. 

To explore the complexities of neofunctionalism and its common alternative, intergovernmentalism, a historical overview of its development, key ideas, and criticism, Therefore, by looking at the work of four important thinkers, and their debates, will help us to understand European unity: Ernst Haas who founded neofunctionalism, Leon Lindberg who tested it, Stanley Hoffmann who criticized it, and Roger Hansen who reviewed its strengths and weaknesses. 

The Origins and fundamental principles of Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism emerged in the mid 1950s among the American political scientists, most notably Ernst Haas, and Lion Lindberg, as a direct response to the early integration process in Western Europe. (Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 89). Other influential scholars in the field include Stuart Scheingold, Philippe Schmitter and Joseph Nye. (ibid). The aim of this theory is to understand how independent states can gradually unite without losing their sovereignty. 

Basic concepts in neofunctional theory.

Haas wants to know whether separate states can become a single political community. For him, a political community exists when groups and individuals feel more loyalty to their shared central institutions than to their governments. (Haas, 1968, p. 107). This doesn't mean everyone agrees, but rather that they agree on the basic rules.

Haas defines the political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings, and he calls his central idea political integration, the process where individuals in different countries ( politicians, business leaders, unions) are:

“persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center”. (Haas, 1968, p.114).

The end result is a new supranational political community.

Ernst Haas established the basic ideas of neofunctionalism, he used the idea that Europe is like a living laboratory in which international relations can be studied practically. (Haas, 1968, p. 106).

The Process: "Spillover" and shifting Loyalties

Haas explains the spillover mechanism, where the initial integration of a sector such as coal and steel in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), creates problem in linked sectors such as agriculture and transport, this generate an objective pressure to expand the scope of central authority and join decision-making to address these new problems, thus pushing the integration process toward further broader convergence. (Haas, 1968, p. 112).

Lindberg agrees with Haas, that integration in one part of the economy may create problems that can be resolved by further integrating or by expanding the role of the central institutions. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 124). 

Haas focuses on elites, leaders, and bureaucrats; they are the first to realize that their interests are better served in a larger European market rather than in their own country. They use their position and manipulative power to position their organizations for or against integration steps. They are the primary drivers of the process by redefining their interest within a broader regional context. (Haas, 1968, p. 115).

Haas argues that the active actors support the integration for distinctly different, and competing reasons, but their interest align on converge within the new institution framework, and sees that ultimate goal was a gradual shift in loyalties toward a new political community to supranational. (Haas, 1968, pp. 113-115).

Lindberg defines the concept of the “spillover” is one of the most important divers of the neofunctionalism model, and the primary driver, it describes and defines the underlying logic of expansion: the initial integrative steps create conditions that necessitate further steps, in other words, integrative steps need additional levers for expansion. Lindberg and Haas have used the concept of “spillover” where integration in one sector leads to pressure for integration in other sectors. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 123). 

Applying the neofunctionalism theory to the European Common Market 

Leon Lindberg applies Haas’s idea to the newly established European Economic Community (EEC), or the European Common Market. He uses a simpler definition: political integration is when states relinquish their abilities of making-policies and begin to make joint decisions to new central bodies. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 119). He doesn’t assume that it will necessarily lead to a full political union, but it might create new kinds of political systems.

Lindberg has found evidence to support his theory in the early years of the European Common Market. A powerful European Commission acted as an intermediary and worked to find common solutions. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 126). National officials began working together regularly and developed a “community mindedness”. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 128) Business and farm groups began organizing at the European level for lobbying. (Lindberg, 1963, pp. 129-130). However, he also noted that most interest groups still focused on their national governments first, and the European-level groups were still weak.

Lindberg confirms that the integration process possesses an inherent, expansive logic. He argues that completing tasks in one sector creates functional pressures and political demands to integrate related sectors, thereby propelling the Community toward further convergence. This "spill-over" is driven not just by treaty design but by the actions of elites (such as business groups, farmers) who seek to achieve their goals at the European level. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 130).

Lindberg's findings refute the idea that support for integration is dependent on favorable economic conditions. Instead, he demonstrates that commitment is pragmatic and institutionalized, rooted in the perception of nearly all major actors including seemingly nationalist leaders like de Gaulle that the Community is an indispensable tool for advancing their core interests and national visions. (ibid).

 Lindberg emphasises that conflicts are resolved according to an “upgrading-of-common-interests” pattern, where an independent mediator (the commission) reframes issues to find solutions. The two crucial elements are an institutionalized mediator and the member states continued commitment to the collective enterprise. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 127). 

Expansion tasks, the job assigned to European bodies, such as trade, should be of a kind that naturally lead to further jobs, such as managing currency, creating a chain of interaction. Solving fights, when countries argue, they shouldn't settle for the weakest compromise. The best way is to upgrade common interests, to find a smarter solution that benefits everyone more, which means granting more powers to the European center. (Lindberg , 1963, p. 125).

Critique of Neofunctionalism: Intergovernmental Theory

Stanley Hoffmann disagrees with Haas, representing the intergovernmentalist perspective. His main idea is that “the nation state is still here". (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 135). The dream of a United Europe has been postponed. Why? Because European countries have different situations and circumstances, histories, and worldview. They couldn’t focus on “building Europe” while ignoring their internal problems or global politics. (ibid).

The Power of Nationalism: The nation-state's strength derives from nationalism, the collective emotions, and mission of its people. This gives it purely administrative or functional international bodies which cannot match. (ibid).

Hoffmann presents a conflict between two logics. Haas’s analysis logic of integration which was set up by Monnet, when the states work together this leads to political unity. While Hoffmann logic of diversity where the states in low risk areas, such as trade rule “low political “ they may cooperate. But in high risk areas, such as defense or foreign policy “high policy" they will never relinquish control to anyone else . They prefer the certainty of running their own affairs. (Hoffmann, 1966, pp. 143-144).

European integration crises and the limits of theory

Hoffmann criticizes the Monnet integration method in triple points: First, gamble on goals, the builders of Europe were vague about the ultimate goal. Was it a super-state or just a cooperative club? This vagueness worked initially, but caused problems later. (Hoffmann , 1966, pp. 144-145). Second, risking the methods, it is not enough to take a piece of national sovereignty indefinitely. The governments will wake up and protect their power. ("the heart of the artichoke". (Hoffmann, 1966, pp. 145-146). Third, risking the results, this process does not automatically produce net benefits for all, crises such as the 1965 crisis with France president Charles de Gaulle’s can stop or reverse integration. (Hoffmann, 1966, pp. 146-147). Hoffmann argues that nations cooperate when they want to or when they choose , but they never lose their fundamental independence. The European Community might be an advanced form of cooperation, but it has not replaced the nation-state. (Hoffmann, 1966, pp. 144-147). 

Roger Hansen’s review of neofunctionalism theory

Roger Hansen reviews neofunctionalism ten years later, to see what aspect of it succeeded and what didn't. Hansen summarized the central neofunctionalist model (Haas-Schmitter Model), which views economic and political union as a continuous process. The starting of economic union leads to a gradual politicization, slowly transferring loyalty and power to the center. (Hansen, 1969, p. 161). 

Hansen points to a fundamental flaw in Europe, the economic sphere operated with remarkable efficiency in isolation. The Common Market created big wealth through minimal cooperation between governments, without needing a strong political union. The "invisible hand" of the market and basic policy coordination were enough. (Hansen, 1969, pp. 168-169).

The economic benefits were spread fairly among the six members, so there weren't many big crises that forced them to integrate further to find solutions. (Hansen, 1969, p. 168). This weakened the "spillover" effect.

Neofunctionalism theory and developing countries

Hansen's biggest criticism is that the neofunctionalism theory is ineffective for integration in regions such as Latin America or Africa, so the Theory Doesn't Fit Developing Countries. In Europe, integration was “low politics” why? Because integration there often makes rich areas richer and poor areas poorer. The struggle for factories and jobs is a major political battle from day one, not a gradual or technical process. (Hansen, 1969, pp 170-173). 

Hansen, like Hoffmann, emphasizes that integration can't be understood by looking inside Europe. External factors have a significant impact. (Hansen, 1969, pp. 175–177). For developing countries, the reason for integration is often external pressure (such as lower prices for their exports). This external pressure is capable of maintaining their cohesion even when they are fighting internally. 

Conclusion 

The way people have thought about European unity has changed over time, and this literature review shows the evolution of thought on European integration. It started with Ernst Haas’s pretty optimistic idea: if countries begin working together on practical economic stuff, and political unity will follow automatically through spillover and changing loyalties. Then Leon Lindberg tested this idea in the real world on the early Common Market and found some evidence, also saw limits; it wasn't as smoothly or automatically as Haas predicted. Then Stanley Hoffmann came along and pushed back hard, arguing from the intergovernmentalist perspective that countries are too protective of their big decisions, especially when it comes to "high politics" (defense, big choices), and never give up control. The "logic of diversity" always wins over the logic of integration. Later, Roger Hansen  reviewed the theory a decade later. and agreed that even when Europe became economically successful, that didn’t automatically turn it into a political union. He agreed that in rich Europe, economic success didn't automatically lead to political union. He also showed that the theory doesn't work for poorer countries, where integration is a fierce political fight from the start. In the end, this debate shows us that bringing countries together is really complicated, it’s not automatic or easy. It’s more like a constant tug-of-war. On one side, there are forces pulling toward unity, such as shared projects and common interests. On the other side, there are forces pulling toward independence, such as national interests, sovereignty, and different worldviews. Understanding this debate helps explain why the European Union is what it is today: not a single country, but also much more than just a simple international club. It’s an ongoing project built on both cooperation and compromise.

References:

• Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2006). Introduction to part 2: Theorizing the common market: neofunctionalism and its critics. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader (pp. 89-104). Palgrave Macmillan.

• Haas, E. B. (2006). The united Europe: political, social and economic forces 1950-1957. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader (pp. 105-116). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1968).

• Lindberg, L. N. (2006). The European dynamic of European economic integration. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader ( pp. 117-133). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1963).

• Hoffmann, S. (2006). Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader (pp. 134-159). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1966).

• Hansen, R. D. (2006). Regional integration: reflection on a decade of theoretical efforts. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader (pp. 160-178). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1969).

 Course: Population and European Development

Professor’s Name: Tamaz Zubiashvili

Student’s Name: Aseel Azizieh

University: TSU

European Union Migration Policy: Balancing Security, Human Rights, and Solidarity

Research Question

How effective is the European Union's migration policy in balancing border security, humanitarian obligations, and responsibility-sharing among member states?

Introduction

Migration has become one of the most significant political and social challenges facing the European Union (EU) in the twenty-first century. The migration crisis of 2015, during which more than one million migrants and asylum seekers entered Europe, exposed major weaknesses in the EU's asylum and border management systems. Since then, the EU has attempted to reform its migration framework through a series of legislative and policy initiatives aimed at strengthening external borders, improving asylum procedures, and promoting cooperation among member states.

The issue remains highly controversial because migration involves competing priorities. On one hand, the EU has legal and moral obligations to protect refugees and uphold human rights. On the other hand, member states seek to maintain national security, control irregular migration, and address public concerns about the social and economic impacts of migration. The adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2024 represents the EU's most comprehensive effort to address these challenges.

This paper examines the evolution of EU migration policy, analyzes the main features of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, and evaluates whether the policy successfully balances security concerns, humanitarian responsibilities, and solidarity among member states.

Background of EU Migration Policy

The foundations of EU migration and asylum policy are based on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which was developed to create common standards for asylum procedures across the Union. One of the most important elements of this system is the Dublin Regulation, which generally requires asylum seekers to submit their applications in the first EU country they enter.

Although the Dublin system was designed to prevent multiple asylum claims in different countries, it created significant pressure on border states such as Italy, Greece, Spain, and Malta. During the 2015 migration crisis, these countries struggled to process large numbers of arrivals, while disagreements emerged among member states regarding responsibility-sharing and refugee relocation.

As migration pressures continued, the European Commission proposed the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2020. After several years of negotiations, the European Parliament approved the Pact in 2024, marking a major reform of EU migration governance.

Main Features of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum

The New Pact seeks to create a more coordinated and predictable migration system throughout the European Union. The policy is based on several key components.

Stronger Border Management

One of the primary goals of the Pact is to strengthen control over the EU's external borders. New screening procedures require migrants entering the EU irregularly to undergo identity, health, and security checks. Authorities also collect biometric information to improve identification and prevent unauthorized movements within the Union.

These measures are intended to improve security and accelerate the processing of asylum claims. Supporters argue that stronger border controls increase public confidence in migration management and reduce irregular migration.

Faster Asylum Procedures

The Pact introduces faster procedures for examining asylum applications. Individuals whose claims are considered unlikely to succeed may be processed through accelerated border procedures, while those with stronger claims can access the regular asylum system.

The EU argues that faster decisions reduce administrative burdens and discourage abuse of asylum mechanisms. At the same time, safeguards are included to protect vulnerable groups, including children and families.

Solidarity and Responsibility-Sharing

One of the most innovative aspects of the Pact is its solidarity mechanism. Under this system, member states are expected to contribute to migration management when frontline countries face significant pressure.

Countries may choose among different forms of support, including relocating asylum seekers, providing financial assistance, or offering operational and technical support. This flexible approach seeks to overcome long-standing disagreements between member states regarding mandatory refugee quotas.

Cooperation with Third Countries

The EU increasingly works with countries of origin and transit to reduce irregular migration. These partnerships focus on border management, combating migrant smuggling, facilitating returns, and expanding legal migration pathways.

Supporters believe such cooperation addresses the root causes of migration and reduces dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean. Critics, however, argue that some partnerships may shift responsibility to countries with weaker human rights protections.

Criticisms and Challenges

Despite its ambitions, the New Pact has received criticism from academics, non-governmental organizations, and human rights advocates.

First, critics argue that the Pact prioritizes security over protection. Accelerated border procedures may limit asylum seekers' ability to present their cases fully, potentially increasing the risk of wrongful rejections.

Second, concerns remain regarding detention and externalization policies. Human rights organizations warn that agreements with non-EU countries could expose migrants to unsafe conditions and undermine international refugee protections.

Third, although the solidarity mechanism is intended to promote burden-sharing, it does not fully eliminate tensions among member states. Some governments continue to oppose refugee relocation and prefer financial contributions instead.

Finally, migration patterns remain highly unpredictable due to conflicts, climate change, economic instability, and geopolitical crises. As a result, the effectiveness of any migration framework depends on its ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

Evaluation of Policy Effectiveness

The New Pact represents a significant improvement over previous EU migration arrangements because it attempts to integrate border management, asylum procedures, and solidarity into a single framework. The policy acknowledges the need for both security and humanitarian protection while recognizing that migration is a shared European challenge.

However, the Pact's success will depend largely on implementation. Strong border procedures may improve efficiency, but they must be accompanied by adequate legal safeguards to protect asylum seekers' rights. Similarly, solidarity mechanisms can only succeed if member states cooperate consistently and share responsibilities fairly.

The EU therefore faces the difficult task of balancing competing objectives: maintaining secure borders, protecting human rights, and preserving political unity among diverse member states. Whether the Pact achieves these goals will become clearer as the new rules enter full application across the Union.

Conclusion

Migration remains one of the most complex policy challenges confronting the European Union. The New Pact on Migration and Asylum reflects the EU's effort to create a more coordinated, efficient, and sustainable migration system after years of political disagreement and institutional shortcomings.

The policy introduces stronger border controls, faster asylum procedures, and new solidarity mechanisms designed to distribute responsibilities more fairly among member states. While these reforms may improve migration management, significant concerns remain regarding human rights protections, detention practices, and the practical implementation of burden-sharing arrangements.

Overall, the EU migration policy demonstrates an ongoing attempt to balance security, humanitarian obligations, and solidarity. Its long-term success will depend on the willingness of member states to cooperate and uphold both the effectiveness and the values upon which the European Union is founded.

References

European Commission. (2024). Pact on migration and asylum. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en

European Commission. (2026). Migration and asylum. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/migration-and-asylum_en

European Union Agency for Asylum. (2026). Pact on migration and asylum. https://www.euaa.europa.eu/pact-migration-and-asylum

Le Monde. (2024, April 10). What's the EU Pact on migration and asylum, up for a final vote in Brussels? https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2024/04/10/what-s-the-eu-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-up-for-a-final-vote-in-brussels_6668011_8.html

Reuters. (2025, March 11). EU proposal would send rejected migrants to centres outside the bloc for deportation. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-proposal-would-send-rejected-migrants-centres-outside-bloc-deportation-2025-03-11/

Reuters. (2025, December 8). EU countries agree positions on new asylum, migrant returns policy. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/eu-countries-agree-positions-new-asylum-migrant-returns-policy-2025-12-08/