Saturday, 3 October 2026

Theorizing The Common Market: Neofunctionalism and its critics


TSU University

Aseel Azizieh 

Literature Review 
Debates on Europe integration

Theorizing The Common Market: Neofunctionalism and its critics 


Introduction 

After the WW|| the Western European countries decided to work together as never before, such as France and Germany. These countries began  by placing their products, such as coal and steel, under a common authority, and established the European Common Market. This process is known as regional integration.

Political scientists have developed theories to explain how and why this integration happened, then two theories neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism emerged. Neofunctionalism emerged in the late 1950s, as a comprehensive explanation of the new European community. (Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 90). There are two main theories exist:

1- Neofunctionalism states that integration starts with one sector, such as trading, and automatically leads to further integration with other sectors, creating political unity, as people’s loyalties shift to the new European center.

2- Intergovernmentalism contradicts neofunctionalism. It argues that national states are still the important actors, such as France and Germany. They cooperate only when it serves their own national interests. 

To explore the complexities of neofunctionalism and its common alternative, intergovernmentalism, a historical overview of its development, key ideas, and criticism, Therefore, by looking at the work of four important thinkers, and their debates, will help us to understand European unity: Ernst Haas who founded neofunctionalism, Leon Lindberg who tested it, Stanley Hoffmann who criticized it, and Roger Hansen who reviewed its strengths and weaknesses. 

The Origins and fundamental principles of Neofunctionalism


Neofunctionalism emerged in the mid 1950s among the American political scientists, most notably Ernst Haas, and Lion Lindberg, as a direct response to the early integration process in Western Europe. (Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 89). Other influential scholars in the field include Stuart Scheingold, Philippe Schmitter and Joseph Nye. (ibid). The aim of this theory is to understand how independent states can gradually unite without losing their sovereignty. 

Basic concepts in neofunctional theory.

Haas wants to know whether separate states can become a single political community. For him, a political community exists when groups and individuals feel more loyalty to their shared central institutions than to their governments. (Haas, 1968, p. 107). This doesn't mean everyone agrees, but rather that they agree on the basic rules.

Haas defines the political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings, and he calls his central idea political integration, the process where individuals in different countries ( politicians, business leaders, unions) are:

“persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center”. (Haas, 1968, p.114).

The end result is a new supranational political community.

Ernst Haas established the basic ideas of neofunctionalism, he used the idea that Europe is like a living laboratory in which international relations can be studied practically. (Haas, 1968, p. 106).

The Process: "Spillover" and shifting Loyalties

Haas explains the spillover mechanism, where the initial integration of a sector such as coal and steel in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), creates problem in linked sectors such as agriculture and transport, this generate an objective pressure to expand the scope of central authority and join decision-making to address these new problems, thus pushing the integration process toward further broader convergence. (Haas, 1968, p. 112).

Lindberg agrees with Haas, that integration in one part of the economy may create problems that can be resolved by further integrating or by expanding the role of the central institutions. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 124). 

Haas focuses on elites, leaders, and bureaucrats; they are the first to realize that their interests are better served in a larger European market rather than in their own country. They use their position and manipulative power to position their organizations for or against integration steps. They are the primary drivers of the process by redefining their interest within a broader regional context. (Haas, 1968, p. 115).

Haas argues that the active actors support the integration for distinctly different, and competing reasons, but their interest align on converge within the new institution framework, and sees that ultimate goal was a gradual shift in loyalties toward a new political community to supranational. (Haas, 1968, pp. 113-115).

Lindberg defines the concept of the “spillover” is one of the most important divers of the neofunctionalism model, and the primary driver, it describes and defines the underlying logic of expansion: the initial integrative steps create conditions that necessitate further steps, in other words, integrative steps need additional levers for expansion. Lindberg and Haas have used the concept of “spillover” where integration in one sector leads to pressure for integration in other sectors. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 123). 


Applying the neofunctionalism theory to the European Common Market 

Leon Lindberg applies Haas’s idea to the newly established European Economic Community (EEC), or the European Common Market. He uses a simpler definition: political integration is when states relinquish their abilities of making-policies and begin to make joint decisions to new central bodies. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 119). He doesn’t assume that it will necessarily lead to a full political union, but it might create new kinds of political systems.

Lindberg has found evidence to support his theory in the early years of the European Common Market. A powerful European Commission acted as an intermediary and worked to find common solutions. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 126). National officials began working together regularly and developed a “community mindedness”. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 128) Business and farm groups began organizing at the European level for lobbying. (Lindberg, 1963, pp. 129-130). However, he also noted that most interest groups still focused on their national governments first, and the European-level groups were still weak.

Lindberg confirms that the integration process possesses an inherent, expansive logic. He argues that completing tasks in one sector creates functional pressures and political demands to integrate related sectors, thereby propelling the Community toward further convergence. This "spill-over" is driven not just by treaty design but by the actions of elites (such as business groups, farmers) who seek to achieve their goals at the European level. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 130).

Lindberg's findings refute the idea that support for integration is dependent on favorable economic conditions. Instead, he demonstrates that commitment is pragmatic and institutionalized, rooted in the perception of nearly all major actors including seemingly nationalist leaders like de Gaulle that the Community is an indispensable tool for advancing their core interests and national visions. (ibid).

 Lindberg emphasises that conflicts are resolved according to an “upgrading-of-common-interests” pattern, where an independent mediator (the commission) reframes issues to find solutions. The two crucial elements are an institutionalized mediator and the member states continued commitment to the collective enterprise. (Lindberg, 1963, p. 127). 

Expansion tasks, the job assigned to European bodies, such as trade, should be of a kind that naturally lead to further jobs, such as managing currency, creating a chain of interaction. Solving fights, when countries argue, they shouldn't settle for the weakest compromise. The best way is to upgrade common interests, to find a smarter solution that benefits everyone more, which means granting more powers to the European center. (Lindberg , 1963, p. 125).


Critique of Neofunctionalism: Intergovernmental Theory

Stanley Hoffmann disagrees with Haas, representing the intergovernmentalist perspective. His main idea is that “the nation state is still here". (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 135). The dream of a United Europe has been postponed. Why? Because European countries have different situations and circumstances, histories, and worldview. They couldn’t focus on “building Europe” while ignoring their internal problems or global politics. (ibid).

The Power of Nationalism: The nation-state's strength derives from nationalism, the collective emotions, and mission of its people. This gives it purely administrative or functional international bodies which cannot match. (ibid).

Hoffmann presents a conflict between two logics. Haas’s analysis logic of integration which was set up by Monnet, when the states work together this leads to political unity. While Hoffmann logic of diversity where the states in low risk areas, such as trade rule “low political “ they may cooperate. But in high risk areas, such as defense or foreign policy “high policy" they will never relinquish control to anyone else . They prefer the certainty of running their own affairs. (Hoffmann, 1966, pp. 143-144).

European integration crises and the limits of theory

Hoffmann criticizes the Monnet integration method in triple points: First, gamble on goals, the builders of Europe were vague about the ultimate goal. Was it a super-state or just a cooperative club? This vagueness worked initially, but caused problems later. (Hoffmann , 1966, pp. 144-145). Second, risking the methods, it is not enough to take a piece of national sovereignty indefinitely. The governments will wake up and protect their power. ("the heart of the artichoke". (Hoffmann, 1966, pp. 145-146). Third, risking the results, this process does not automatically produce net benefits for all, crises such as the 1965 crisis with France president Charles de Gaulle’s can stop or reverse integration. (Hoffmann, 1966, pp. 146-147). Hoffmann argues that nations cooperate when they want to or when they choose , but they never lose their fundamental independence. The European Community might be an advanced form of cooperation, but it has not replaced the nation-state. (Hoffmann, 1966, pp. 144-147). 

Roger Hansen’s review of neofunctionalism theory

Roger Hansen reviews neofunctionalism ten years later, to see what aspect of it succeeded and what didn't. Hansen summarized the central neofunctionalist model (Haas-Schmitter Model), which views economic and political union as a continuous process. The starting of economic union leads to a gradual politicization, slowly transferring loyalty and power to the center. (Hansen, 1969, p. 161). 

Hansen points to a fundamental flaw in Europe, the economic sphere operated with remarkable efficiency in isolation. The Common Market created big wealth through minimal cooperation between governments, without needing a strong political union. The "invisible hand" of the market and basic policy coordination were enough. (Hansen, 1969, pp. 168-169).

The economic benefits were spread fairly among the six members, so there weren't many big crises that forced them to integrate further to find solutions. (Hansen, 1969, p. 168). This weakened the "spillover" effect.

Neofunctionalism theory and developing countries

Hansen's biggest criticism is that the neofunctionalism theory is ineffective for integration in regions such as Latin America or Africa, so the Theory Doesn't Fit Developing Countries. In Europe, integration was “low politics” why? Because integration there often makes rich areas richer and poor areas poorer. The struggle for factories and jobs is a major political battle from day one, not a gradual or technical process. (Hansen, 1969, pp 170-173). 

Hansen, like Hoffmann, emphasizes that integration can't be understood by looking inside Europe. External factors have a significant impact. (Hansen, 1969, pp. 175–177). For developing countries, the reason for integration is often external pressure (such as lower prices for their exports). This external pressure is capable of maintaining their cohesion even when they are fighting internally. 

Conclusion 

The way people have thought about European unity has changed over time, and this literature review shows the evolution of thought on European integration. It started with Ernst Haas’s pretty optimistic idea: if countries begin working together on practical economic stuff, and political unity will follow automatically through spillover and changing loyalties. Then Leon Lindberg tested this idea in the real world on the early Common Market and found some evidence, also saw limits; it wasn't as smoothly or automatically as Haas predicted. Then Stanley Hoffmann came along and pushed back hard, arguing from the intergovernmentalist perspective that countries are too protective of their big decisions, especially when it comes to "high politics" (defense, big choices), and never give up control. The "logic of diversity" always wins over the logic of integration. Later, Roger Hansen  reviewed the theory a decade later. and agreed that even when Europe became economically successful, that didn’t automatically turn it into a political union. He agreed that in rich Europe, economic success didn't automatically lead to political union. He also showed that the theory doesn't work for poorer countries, where integration is a fierce political fight from the start. In the end, this debate shows us that bringing countries together is really complicated, it’s not automatic or easy. It’s more like a constant tug-of-war. On one side, there are forces pulling toward unity, such as shared projects and common interests. On the other side, there are forces pulling toward independence, such as national interests, sovereignty, and different worldviews. Understanding this debate helps explain why the European Union is what it is today: not a single country, but also much more than just a simple international club. It’s an ongoing project built on both cooperation and compromise.

References:


  • Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2006). Introduction to part 2: Theorizing the common market: neofunctionalism and its critics. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader (pp. 89-104). Palgrave Macmillan.


  • Haas, E. B. (2006). The united Europe: political, social and economic forces 1950-1957. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader (pp. 105-116). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1968).


  • Lindberg, L. N. (2006). The European dynamic of European economic integration. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader ( pp. 117-133). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1963).


  • Hoffmann, S. (2006). Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader (pp. 134-159). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1966).


  • Hansen, R. D. (2006). Regional integration: reflection on a decade of theoretical efforts. In M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (Ed.), Debates on Europe integration: A reader (pp. 160-178). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1969).

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